Throughout the 1980's, governments introduced tax policies designed to encourage individual saving. These were, at least in part, motivated by the perception that households were not saving enough to provide adequately for their retirement. The main task of this paper is to examine the consumption of retiring households empirically and in particular the degree of consumption smoothing around the time of retirement. We are not the first to examine this issue. Daniel Hammermesh (1984) , Jerry Hausman and Lynne Paquette ( 1987) , and B. Douglas Bernheim ( 1993) , among others, have claimed that agents are not saving enough to maintain their consumption levels after retirement. Showing that consump-tion levels fall after retirement, however, is not sufficient evidence for retirement saving being too low-simple models predict that consumption should be smoothed across periods of predictably high and low income, but in general it is the marginal utility of consumption, not necessarily consumption itself, that is smoothed across time periods. Changes in family size, changes in the number of adult workers, mortality, and aging itself, for example, may systematically alter the marginal utility of consumption over the life cycle and lead to an optimal fall in consumption around retirement. So is there really a retirementsavings puzzle?
To address this question we use data on British households over the last 25 years. Previous research on these data suggests that by controlling adequately for demographics in preferences and nonseparabilities with labor supply, it is possible to explain observed agecons~imption profiles far working-age households using the framework of the life-cycle model.' None of this research has looked at the consumption smoothing of households around the time of retirement. Institutional factors make Britain an interesting point of analysis. The fact that income in retirement relative to that in emplojiment (i.e., the replacement rate) is typically lower than in the Tl3E AMERICAN ECOh'OMIC REVIEW SEI'TEMBER 1998 United States means that we can observe income falling rapidly as groups of I~ouseholds retire. Moreover, this has changed systematically across date-of-birth cohorts. Secondly, the fact that in the United States the bulk of medical costs are paid for by the state only after retirement creates a significant divergence between consumption and expenditure which affects only the elderly. Imputing the value of health care to the retired becomes an important issue. In Britain this issue does not arise to the same extent since state-provided health care is available at all ages. Much of consuniption might also become subsidized on retirement--but again in Britain this only relates to some small health charges and to certain public transport fares. After presenting evidence on the decline in consumption following retirement, with the analysis split by education group as well as date-of-birth cohort, we exanline the likely causes of this decline. First we allow preferences (and hence changes in consumption) to depend on changes in family composition and age. A reduced level of expenditure may well be consistent with maintaining a constant level of marginal utility of consumption as individuals age. Axel H.Borsch-Supan and Konrad Stahl ( 1991) argue that the marginal utility derived from corisumption diminishes among the "older" old (defined as those over 70) and that unexpected age and healthrelated consumption constraints can account for falling consumption and hence wealth accumulation during retirement.' However, this would have little implication for the consumption of most British households since retirement usually occurs at a younger age. Indeed, the predictions from a model of consumption growth that includes family size and age explain a substantial amount of the hump in consumption for working-age households, but cannot rationalize all of the dip in consumption growth at retirement observed in the data.
Their argument is supported by cross section evidence from West Germany which shows expenditure on most items declining with age and increasing savings among the very old.
It is possible that mortality risk may induce additional affects on observed consul~~ptior~ growth---the sample may be getting systematically richer since survival is positively correlated with wealth or discount rates may rise as irldividuals come close to the end of their life cycles. The analysis we present considers the extent of differential mortality and, following Michael D. Hurd (1989) , allows consumption growth to depend on average survival roba abilities for each cohort. Although this is important, it cannot explain the puzzle.
A natural source of ex~lanation lies in the direct impact of work on consumption-the consumption needs of households out of the labor market may well be less than those of workers. Instead of simply including a dummy variable to capture retirement we use unemployment directly as a control for the impact of the labor-market participation on consumption. Using observations on households with heads out of the labor market (both the unemployed and the retired), we allow consumption changes to depend on labor-market status as well as demographic variables. Allowing for labormarket status to be endogenous, consurnption growth is shown to fall significantly with anficipated periods out of the labor market. his direct i m~a c t of work on consumption explains an important part, but not all, of the puzzle.
Of course. it mav be that ~e r i o d s out of the labor market due to unemployment have a different direct impact on consumption than retirement. The data point to large falls in most consumption items at retirement, not just work-related expenditures. Expenditure reductions are larger than those for households entering unemployment, although income falls are smaller.
So how can the remaining drop in consumption be reconciled with standard theory? We argue that, unless we systematically mismeasure either consumption or expected mortality rates, the evidence points to the arrival of new and unfavorable information at retirement. (Of course, the puzzle could be generated by unanticipated early retirements, but in our sample cohorts retire quickly and close to the mandatory age, suggesting this is not an explanation.) For example, there may be unexpected revisions to future pension wealthwe cite evidence below that these are strongly negative. There may also be unanticipated shocks to perceived lifetime needs (through health or life expectancy) occurring at the time of retirement as individuals associate less with younger working colleagues and mix instead with older people.
I. The Empirical Puzzle
Many studies have argued that the failure of households to decumulate their asset holdings after their retirement is a puzzle that a simple life-cycle hypothesis cannot explain. Bernheim (1987) , for example, found that individuals decumulated their assets at a low rate-less than 2 percent a year--and argued that the resuonse of rates of decumulation to changes in annuitization could not be accounted for by the simple 1ife.cycle hypothesis. But showing that households fail to nun down their wealth in retirement is not necessarily evidence in favor of a puzzle. A failure to run down wealth levels would not imply a reduction in consumption if income levels are maintained throughout retirement. Alternatively, Hurd (1990) argued that the observed pattern of wealth decumulation was consistent with consumption smoothing if allowance was made for uncertainty over the date of death (see also James Davies, 1981) . While such uncertainty might cause risk-neutral individuals to increase their current consumption so as not to die with unspent assets, risk-averse individuals will reduce current consumption to ensure that their wealth will stretch over a possibly longer and uncertain horizon and, thus, will begin to run down their wealth later, not necessarily at retirement.
There is also some indirect evidence showing that the desire to leave a bequest is an important motive for saving (see Laurence Kotlikoff and Laurence Summers, 1989) . But according to the life-cycle hypothesis an anticipated bequest motive would entail a lower consumption path over a longer period of an individual's life span, not just wealth accumulation following retirement. In what follows we address these issues by looking at income and consumption jointly rather than asset decumulation. By considering the paths of income and expenditure for different generations of households before and after their retirement we can look directly at the degree of consumption smoothing while: controlling for factors such as retirement income and mortality risk.
A. The Pattern of Income and Consumption Around Retir~ment
Thr: data we use in this paper are drawn from the 2.5 successive years of the Family Expenditure Suwey (FES) from 1968 to 1992. The FES is an annual cross section survey of about 7,000 British households that collectlj detailed information on household characterjlstics, incomes, and expenditures. Since it is not a panel, we need to create a "pseudo-panel" to link the data over time and enable the investigation of dynamic relationships. ' This involves dividing households into groups according to their date of birth and then taking means within each cohort group and each time period to get a time series for each cohort (see Angus Deaton, 1985) . Since the aim of this studv is to consider consumption and income around the time of retirement, we use relatively small (four-year) date-of-birth bands into which to ciivide the households, thus limiting the dispersion of age within each cell. To lceep the cell sizes large enough this definition requires taking annual, rather than quarterly, trme averages. The resulting cohort data set therefore has 25 annual observations on each of 12 cohorts (see Table  A1 in the Appendix for more details).
Although the retirement age in Britain is 65 for men and 60 for women, many individuals do not actually retire at those ages. We cannot simply compare consumption before and after these dates. The first point of analysis is therefore to investigate when cohorts actually retire. To do this we focus on cohorts for which we have more than a few years data on either side of the official retirement ages (those born between 191 1 and 1926). The bold line, labelled "E," in Figure 1 shows; the proportion of household heads in employment for each of these four cohorts as the average age of the cohort increases. Throughout this paper we Since we have alrcady split the sarrlple by collort, we cannot separately identify tirne frorn age effects on income. 111 the absence of cohort differences we could avcrage by age to srnooth out the tirne effects but, for. in-. comes at least, these cohort effects are large so this option 
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different household sizes we equivalize real consumption and real income using the simple equivalence scales estimated from FES data and described in Banks and Paul Johnson (1994) .4 Consumption and income fall for each cohort as the households retire.
(Throughout this paper we define the retirement status of the household as that of the head only.) This pattern is much less pronounced for the younger cohorts, however. Comparing those born between 191 1-1914 with those born between 1923 -1926, there is evidence of a much higher income replacement rate for the younger households and a much smoother path of consumption as they retire. For households in the oldest cohort there is some evidence of a divergence between income and consumption as households age further. It is not surprising that income falls after retirement. When a household retires, its income becomes mainly composed of dissaving through pension payments, although other state benefits may be very important. What is surprising, however, is that consumption falls and that it appears to fall faster than income does. This means that cohorts are not running down their financial assets, and may even be resaving some of their income. It is worth noting that these profiles do not imply large aggregate saving rates which would be in contradiction to the aggregate statistics for Britain in the 1970's and 1980's. This is primarily because the measure of total expenditure in these figures excludes spending on large household durables. Durable expenditures are typically not well recorded in diary surveys although, if anything, might be thought to fall when a household retires, which would further exaggerate the effects we find. To the extent that this is captured in our data, Figure A1 in the Appendix demonstrates that this is indeed the case. The reliability of trends is not open to us (although we will exploit t h~s for components of consumption).
The number of adult equivalents is computed using values of 0.6 for second or subsequent adults and 0.43 for each child. These values were estimated from 1992 FES data. The results that follow are robust to changes in the equivalence scales.
in FES data on aggregate spending and individual items, in comparison to other sources of information including National Accounts, is established in the study by Tanner (1997) . Lump-sum payments at retirement could also distort the measurement of resources. However, evidence from the Retirement Survey (see Richard Disney et al. [1998] , for a description) suggests that only one-fifth of British retirees receive a lump-sum payment on retirement and do not invest or annuitize it, and these lump sums tend to be small.
It is possible, however, that the presence of asset income in the income definition biases the timelage profiles and may explain the observed divergence between income and consumption. High real interest rates at the end of our sample period meant high income growth for the very rich, who have lower marginal propensities to consume, and this would tend to reduce consumption growth. If wealth holdings differ by education group (see, for example, Thad Mirer [1979] ), then splitting the sample by education group before agegating oughtto provide some information on the extent of this problem. Indeed, if wealth and education are correlated then this might also go some way towards redressing the effects of differential mortality rates in the cohort aggregate profiles.
In Figure 2 we break down the population into education groups to examine the extent of this aggregation bias using just one cohort for ~implicity.~ In the left panel we provide consumption and income profiles for the households who left school at the compulsory school leaving age (approximately 70 percent of the households), whereas in the right-hand panel we plol the same profiles for the rest of the sample, i.e., those who undertook some voluntarv further education. There is more evidence of the decline in consumption around retirement for the former group of households (which might also be thought to have lower wealth, on average) and income continues to fall after retirement. Evidence of the divergence between income 'In the FES the number of years of schooling was asked only from 1978, shortening the time series for this part of our analysis from 25 to 15 years. ~BORN1923-1924 and consumption remains for the bettereducated households, although the cell sizes are much smaller and hence there is more noise. The next section sets up a framework in which we can address the degree to which the reduction in consumption is anticipated by retiring households.
B. Anticipated versus Unanticipated
Changes in Consumption
The life-cycle model provides a natural setting in which to consider the anticipated effects of retirement on consumption growth. Assuming lifetime utility displays intertemporal additive separability, we can allow parameters to depend on the composition of a household and write:
where T is the lifetime of the household and So -t S1ziir is the discount rate for a houschold with characteristics z,, including age, for example. Assuming within-period utility (or felicity) functions exhibit constant relative risk aversion (CRRA), u(Ci,) takes the form in which 0, + 01z2,captures the way in which demographic variables, z,,, , scale withinperiod consumption and p, + p'z,, reflects the degree of risk aversion for a household with demographic characteristics z,, .
Equating expected marginal utilities between time periods yields the first-order condition for consumption growth over the life cycle (see Robert Hall [I9781 or Martin Browning et al. [1985] ). When demographics enter preferences in all places, the form of the consumption growth equation is6 'See, for example, Attanasio and Weber ( 1993) . In our empirical investigation we initially assume that dernographics only scale within-period consumption, and hence enter the consumption-growth equation in differences. In later sections we will allow interaction terms to control for demographic effects on the intertemporal elasticity of consutnption.
where a , = (-PIP,), a, = (--8/po), a, = ( -Slp,) , a4= ( -1lp,) , r, is the real interest rate, E, is an expectation error such that E, ,E, = 0 and the intercept term a, therefore contains an adjustment for the log-linear approximation error as well as the household's discount rate 6,). The term E, will reflect, among other things, unpredictable shocks to interest rates, employment status, retirement income, or family composition.
The removal of i subscripts on the consumption and demographic terms signifies the switch to (exactly aggregated) cohort means that allows this equation to be estimated on the cohort-aggregated pseudo-panel data described in the previous section.' Fumio Hayashi ( 1987) established the need for a long time series in the estimation of consumption growth models of this type. We assume that the time series of 25 years of cross section data in our application is sufficiently long for the time average of c, to be close to zero. Given that our purpose in this paper is to consider deviations of actual consumption growth from the predictions of ( 3 ) , the degree to which individual parameters are affected by the presence of approximation error is not a major issue.
As a baseline specification we estimate the consumption growth model in (3) using as a dependent variable the change in log nondurable expenditure, controlling for demographic composition by scaling expenditure by the number of adults and children as before. We also control for the effect of multiple (i.e., more than two) adults and allow a time-dependent discount rate by including the average age of the head of the household. This analysis corresponds to previous consumption growth models estimated using British data, which have shown that household composition is an important determinant of consumption paths (see Attanasio and Browning [1995] , for example). The estimated consumption growth equation8 is given by:
'It is quite possible that E , contains an MA( 1 ) error reflecting the differencing of variables that are measured with error. This autocorrelation is accounted for in estimation by using, as instruments in a Generalized Methods of Moments estimation procedure, only variables lagged by at least two periods.
" 11 models are estimated using Instrumental Variables with instruments lagged at least two periods to allow where standard errors, reported below the estimated coefficients, are robust to the presence of unknown heteroskedasticity and an MA( 1 ) error term. The estimation controls for the endogeneity of the multiple adult and real interest rate variables9 and allows the period t values of these variables )to be uncertain at time t -1 when the planned level of C, is chosen. The estimated coefficient of 0.493 on the real interest rate vields an estimate of the coefficient of risk aversion of approximately -2; the (anticipated) arrival of a third adult in the household causes consumption growth to increase temporarily, as expected. The negative age coefficient gives some support to the idea that discount rates rise with age.
Also reported with this model are the Sargan Criterion (SC), i.e., the test statistic for overidentifying restrictions which, under the null, has an asymptotic X 2 distribution with 15 degrees of freedom, and the IV goodness-of-fit measure, G R 2 , from Hashem Pesaran and Richard Smith ( 1994) .
The main difference between this baseline model and others estimated for Britain is that retired households have been kept in the for the presence of an MA(1) error arising from the differencing of log expenditure. All specifications also include a constant term and a dummy to capture the effect of the 1980's.
" The instrument set contains age of head of household, per capita real GDP at age 20, a lag of the inflation rate, two-period lags of the interest rate, consumption growth, income growth, proportion of households with children, and change in mortality rate, and two-and ~hree-period lags of proportion of households with multiple adults, proportion of heads and proportion of second adults unemployed, and proportion of heads and proportion of second adults retired. sample, whereas previous studies have used working-age households only. Placing the model in a framework of anticipated and unanticipated consumption growth then allows us to consider differences between the two paths for retired households.
C. The Postretirement Dip in Consumption Growth
The essence of our evaluation of the retirement-savings puzzle lies in consideration of the prediction error term from the estimated consumption growth model. According to lifecycle theory, the innovations to the consumption growth process, .zit, relate directly to discounted future real income shocks. As a guide to this argument, consider the approximation l o where y,, ,,is the real income series. If the level of retirement income at period t is fully anticipated at period t -1 then observed consumption growth should not re.-act to the change in income. However, if income changes are partly unanticipated, as may be the case around the point of retirement, then they will enter s, and therefore influence the observed path of consumption growth and result in unanticipated consumption changes.
Another important distinction is between the permanent and transitory components of income shocks. We may write the process for income of household i in period e as:
where y j; represents the permanent component of income and u, the transitory shock in period t . The permanent component is assumed to follow a random walk ' O see Deaton and Christina Paxson ( 1994) for the exact derivation under quadratic preferences.
so that the process for income becomes (7)
Y i t = Y i / -i $ -~i t -~i / -~+ V t /~
Using (4) and ( 7 ) , for large T -t , we have That is, the consumption innovation is simply proportional to the sum of the annuity value (assuming no discounting) of the transitory shock and permanent shock." Therefore, to the extent that income shocks associated with retirement and unemployment have different transitory and permanent-components, they are appropriately accounted for in the consumption growth equation.
The predictions from the estimation of (3) can be used to obtain the expectation error where E, , c,, measures the one-step-ahead -predictions of consumption in period t given information available in period t -1 which will include anticipated permanent and transitory changes to income. For example, retirement may correspond to an anticipated permanent reduction in income and as such should not enter the expectation error. Over the time series the errors in ( 9 ) should average to zero but will in any specific time period, as discussed above, represent the impact of unexpected news on consumption growth and could relate to news regarding future wealth, length of life, health, etc.
In Figure 3 we plot actual consumption growth and the one-step-ahead within-sample predictions of consumption growth by age, av-' I The derivation of E,, requires that the consumer can separately identify transitory LC,, from permanent u,, income shocks which we assume throughout. For a more general model, see Blundell and Ian Preston (1998) , for example. 
FIGURE 3. ACTUAL AND PREDICTED C~N S I J M P T I~N C;ROWTH, BY ACE DEMOGRAPHIC C~N T R O L .ÕNLY
eraging over cohort^.'^ The model predictions reflect well the positive consumption growth in rnidlife but at the time of retirement the predicted (i.e., anticipated) consumption growth does not fall by enough to match the observed postretirement dip in consumption growth in the data. Actual consumption falls by as much as 3 percent a year at age 63, but the predicted fall in consumption growth at this age is less than l1I2 percent. Eventually consumption growth is restored to zero, but not until consumption has fallen by substantially more than the anticipated effects in the consumption growth equation would have predicted.
Resolving the Puzzle
The results of the previous section have suggested that there is evidence of a "In this figure we present nonparametric regressions of actual and "predicted" consumption growth against age to average over cohorts. We use an Adaptive Kernel estimator with a Gaussian Kernel; the bandwidth is chosen to be one-third of the Mean Integrated Squared Error (see Wolfgang Hardle, 1990 ). retirement-savings puzzle. Either individuals are systematically making errors in their expectations of income in retirement, or their expectations are correct but their consumption and saving decisions are not fully captured by the life-cycle model as set out abovc. There are several ways in which we can enhance the simple model to try to explain consumption behavior for retiring households. We consicler two extensionsallowing for mortality risk. and incorporating labor-market-related costs.
A. Mortality Risk
Households with a higher survival probability are likely to forego consumption today in favor of consumption tomorrow. To allow for mortality risk we therefore follow the suggestion of Hurd (1989) and include a term in the change in the (exactly aggregated) logarithm of the survival probability, A In a,, computed from the life-expectancy tables for the United Kingdom (Office of Population Censuses and Surveys, 1987) .The significance of The survival term enters positively, as anticipated. Since our mortality term varies only with the age and sex of the head and not with wealth, income, or education there is little scope for both A In a, and age in the estimated equation. In what follows we omit age from our specifications but retain it as an instrument. The important question is the extent to which controlling for differential mortality risk can remove the gap between unanticipated and anticipated consumption paths observed in Figure 3 . The revised consumption paths, estimated with the inclusion of the survival probability term, are presented in Figure  4 . There is very little impact on the dip, although the increasing consumption growth for those over 70 years of age is pulled down by this adjustment as could be expected. Bt is interesting to note that older households are still observed to have negative consumptionl growth despite the sample getting richer, on average, over time.
At this point it would seem worth examining the sources of empirical bias that could result From differential mortality risk and evaluating their likely impact on our estimates. There are two types of bias resulting from mortality risk when estimating a consumption growth equation from pseudo-panel data of the type used here. The first is the standard attrition bias that would be found in individual panel data or pseudo-panel data whenever there is correlation between the survival probability across individuals and unexpected shocks to their consumption growth. This may well be important for consumption growth after rttire-ment since the wealthier may be expected to live longer and, as we have already argued, some shocks to consumption growth over this period have been wealth dependent.'' The second source of potential bias is specific to pseudo-panel data and occurs where the population of survivors in any cohort is not drawn from the same distribution as those from the same cohort in the previous period (this could also occur for the same reasons as those causing the attrition bias in a standard panel data set). The average expectation error in the pseudo-panel growth equation will not necessarily be zero and may therefore bias the estimated-growth equation.
As an inquiry into the potential seriousness of ths bias we present Figure A2 in the Appendix-a plot of average years spent in education by age and cohort for those households over age 50. If less-educated (and, we assume, lesswealthy) households die earlier than the more educated, then the composition of the population of survivors from one period to the next will change and the average education of the cohort will rise as the cohort ages. Although there is some evidence of increasing noise as the older cohorts age, the only major upward drifts in average education happen after age 75-particularly for the oldest cohorts (who are aged 74 in 1979 when our education data begin).
These issues are further explored by excluding older households from the sample in estimating the consumption growth equations. The results of this experiment (presented in Table A2 in the Appendix) show that selecting only the younger groups, i.e., those less than 65 years of age, changes little except the parameter on the survival probability.
" Any correlation between consumption and exits from the sample will cause this bias. For example, if length of life was distributed randomly across the population one might think that agents who are likely to die soon will be spending more than those who expect to live longer, so as these individuals die out, consumption in the sample may fall. However, we expect the predominant correlation to be between high wealth and life expectancy, which would lead to estimates of consumption growth not falling by enough as households age. If this is the case the bias would strengthen the conclusions of our empirical results.
B. Incorporating Labor-Market Status
When preferences for consumption depend directly on labor-market status, the life-cycle model suggests that there will be a predictable decline in expenditure when households leave the labor market. This decline is not necessarily associated with a decline in consumption services l4 or marginal utility. It is natural 1. 0 ask whether the observed fall in expenditure at retirement simply reflects this predictable change in needs.
We control for the direct impact of retirement (and unemployment) on the marginal utility of consumption by introducing a dummy taking the value one if the head of the household is out of the labor market. The parameter on the change in this variable, appropriately instrumented, should give the anticipated effect on consumption growth associated with withdrawal from the labor markct and therefore captures the planned adjustment of consumption to the retirement event. This is true when retirement is anticipated regardless of whether is a choice variable. In Figure 5 we show the proportion of households out of the labor market at each age, decomposed into those households with heads that are retired and those that are unemployed. As expected, the estimated coefficient on the labor-market dummy is negative and significant, and other parameters are largely unaffected by its introduction.
In Figure 6 we use this specification to analyze the dip in consumption growth. Labormarket status clearly has had an effect. Although some of the observed dip in consumption growth is accounted for by the onestep predictions of the model, the puzzle remains -anticipated consumption falls by around 2 percent per year between ages 60 and 65, whereas the fall in actual observed consumption growth is as much as 3 percent.
Comparing Retirement and Unemployment
An attraction of the above approach to evaluating the impact of retirement through the labor-market status dummy is that we follow cohorts through periods of unemployment and retirement. By imposing the same impact on marginal utility of consumption we are less subject to the criticism of introducing a dummy to overfit the data and solve the puzzle. However, it may be that the simple "out of the labor market" effect is not sufficient to capture completely household preferences as they retire. In what follows we present some descriptive analysis of the size of consumption changes, both for total expenditure and constituent components, as households retire or become unemployed. We then consider the model of consumption growth that allows retirement and unemployment to affect separately preferences and compare the predictions of this model with the outturn observed in the data.
We begin by considering the magnitude of falls in consumption as employment and retirement status change. We analyze periods of unemployment in addition to retirement to see if we can evaluate whether the effect of retirement on consumption can be captured wholly by the effects of the household being out of the labor market, or whether there is an additional effect associated only with retirement. 1x1 Table I we present &)ESestimates of changes in per capita consumption and per capita income regressed on changes in unemployment and retirement--merely to assess the magnitudes of raw differences between the two effects.
The first two columns show that the average income of a cohort falls more with a change in the proportion unemployed than with a change in the proportion in retirement. The re.-verse is true for consu~nption. For example, the results imply that a I-percentage-point rise in the proportion retired is associated with a 0.352-percent fall in average consumption, whereas the effect is only 0.227 percent for a change in the unemployment rate of 1 percentage point. Conditioning on changes in income, the effect of unemployment on total consumption is positive while there is no significant effect of retirement. This suggests, insofar as the fall in income is not completely matched by the fall in consumption, that the unemployed are partially smoothing their consumption. What is surprising is that this does not happen more in the case of retirement. Retirement would seem to be a more predictable event and may well be an endogenous decision for many individuals so that unanticipated negative wealth effects can be avoided.
In the last column of Table 1 we consider the possibility that the differences between the unemployed and retired are related to age, due, for example, to an experience effect in substituting leisure for consumption or alternatively to shocks to income or employment being more likely to be permanent for older households. We split the unemployed into those aged less than 50 and those over 50 and once again look at the effect on changes in log consumption controlling for changes in income. The old unemployed do indeed behave more like the retired than their younger unemployed counterparts -the younger unemployed smooth their consumption more. But, in practice it is difficult to distinguish between the old unemployed and the retired. For example, in Britain, of those born between 1919-1923, more than half of those unemployed over the age of 55 do not return to work . Adding further interactions, for example between income and unemployment changes, does not alter these conclusions.
Our earlier discussion has suggested that the fall in consumption at retirement may reflect the permanent decline in workrelated expenditures. To analyze this further we decompose consumption into three different categories to reflect those goods that are likely to be work related (canteen and restaurant meals, transport, and adult clothing), those that are basic necessities (food consumed in the home and domestic f u e l ) , and the remainder of nondurable items (personal and household services, entertainment, etc ) .
In Figure 7 we plot age profiles for two of these commodity groups: work-related goods food and basic items. The figure shows that spending (per adult equivalent) on workrelated commodities falls among retiring households as anticipated. However the figure also shows that even expenditure on basic necessities falls at and after retirement, and that this is attributable mainly to a fall in spending on food consumed in the home.15 Table 2 examines this further. Parameter estimates are presented for changes in basic expenditure items and changes in spending on work-related items associated with retirement and unemployment. The first two columns show estimates for the changes in the logarithm of basic expenditures as the proportion of unemployed and retired changes; in the second of the two we condition on changes in total household expenditure. The third and fourth columns present the same analysis for work-related costs. There is a shift in consumption expenditures at retirement away from work-related goods.'' The fact that unemployment has a smaller negative effect in column 3 on work-related expenditures may be explained by the search costs of looking for work. Columns 1 and 3, that control for changes in total expenditure, show that the dif-" This comparison is also useful since food expenditure is the primary consumption information available in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics ( P S I D ) .
'"And hence retirement is not separable from the disaggregated consumption items. ferences between the retired and unemployed households can be largely explained by changes in the total consumption levels between these two groups.
A. Consumption Growth with Retirement and Unemployment
A natural extension to our consumption growth equation is to separate out anticipated unemployment and retirement. The following specification retains the out-oflabor market dummy variable as before, but introduces an extra labor-market variable taking the value one if the head of the household is unemployed: In B is the log of "basic expenditure" on food consumed in the home and domestic energy. In W is the log of ''work-related expenditures" on canteen and restaurant meals, transport, and adult clothing.
there is a significant difference between the retired and unemployed households (the specification is set up so that the t-ratio on head unemployed also gives the test of equality of effects between the retired and the unemployed), the point estimates that planned consumption falls by more for households that expect to retire. Figure 8 shows the paths of actual and anticipated consumption growth using the above model, controlling separately for unemployment and retirement. The revised model now predicts the hump in consumption during middle age very well, and the divergence between actual and anticipated consumption profiles can be reconciled to a greater degree-consumption is predicted to fall by just over 2 percent a year at age 63, compared to an actual fall of around 3 percent.17 Controlling for the impact of anticipated changes in labor-market participation on consumption growth l7We also consider how our results could be affected by choosing to allow the demographic and labor-market variables to affect the household's intertemporal elasticity of substitution as opposed to simply scaling consumption expenditures. Using plausible val~les for consumption the results are quantitatively similar--the implied fall in consumption growth for those leaving the labor market is diminished for those going into unemployment as opposed to retirement. Results for this model are available from the authors on request. 
HV. Conclusions
This paper has shown that a significant proportion of the fall in consumption that occurs around retirement can be explained within the life-cycle model in terms of anticipated changes in household demographics and labor-market status--i.e., through the nonseparability of consumption from leisure. However, there remains an important proportion of the fall in consumption that is still unexplained. Whereas the anticipated fall in consumption growth is around 2 percent, actual consumption growth at retirement falls by as much as 3 percent.
What else within the life-cycle model could explain this remaining dip in consumption growth? The following three possible explanations can be ruled out. Liquidity constraints are typically important when income rises but not when income is falling. If liquidity constraints were anticipated there should have been more preretirement saving. Second, early retirement may be associated with a reduced income until the full pension age but consumption should only fall if the early retirement was unexpected. Finally, income risk may be resolved at retirement-especially for those whose retirement salary is closely related to their final earnings or the prevailing interest rate. When risk is reduced, consumption growth should fall but this should be caused by a rise in current consumption not a fall in future consumption, an explanation at odds with observed behavior.
This evidence strongly suggests that there are unanticipated shocks occurring around the time of retirement. One explanation may be found in the increasing body of evidence that individuals underestimate their future pension entitlements. Andrew Dilnot et al. (1994) provide evidence from the Retirement Survey that, for 40 percent of individuals, retirement income was less than they had expected; only onetenth of the sample had pension income that exceeded their preretirement expectations. Moreover, in the United States the President's Commission on Pension Policy found evidence of a substantial "expectations gap." There may as an individual's peer group changes. Both of also be other informational shocks occurring at these could be explained by a change of inforthe time of retirement. As we mentioned above, mation at retirement rather than necessarily reexpectations of the implications of illness or flecting a lack of rationality in consumption bad health might change following retirement choices over the life cycle. Tables A1 and A2 and Figures A1 and A2 appear below. 
